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Introduction1

Both response briefs assert that Judge Harris, in granting UDOT' s motion
for clarification, treated it as a motion for reconsideration of a summary
judgment motion denied by Judge Kennedy. (UDOT Resp. Br. at 40; ClydeGeneva Resp. Br. at 28.) If Judge Harris reconsidered the prior summary
judgment motion, then Judge Harris not only failed to consider the evidence
provided in response to the summary judgment motion, but also lacked the
authority to revisit Judge Kennedy's ruling under the coordinate judge rule. Each
error provides an independent ground to reverse the dismissal of Build' s claims.
First, Judge Harris erred by ignoring (or weighing) the evidence on
summary judgement when he ruled that Build provided no evidence that the
UDOT engineer-Rex Harrison-believed that the work requested by UDOT was
outside the scope of the contract. Mr. Harrison's belief is a dispositive fact under
Meadow Valley Contractors v. UDOT, 2011 UT 35, 266 P.3d 671, which held that a

contractor must provide UDOT written notice of an "alleged change" if UDOT' s
engineer believed the requested work to be outside the scope of the contract.
Judge Harris incorrectly dismissed Build's claim under Meadow Valley on
the ground that Build provided no evidence to contradict UDOT' s evidence that
Mr. Harrison did not believe the work to be outside the scope of the contract. But

For simplicity, Build refers to both UDOT and Clyde-Geneva as "UDOT."
Because the two response briefs are substantially similar in many sections, this
reply will cite to UDOT' s response unless responding to an argument found
solely in Clyde-Geneva's brief.
1

1
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in Meadow Valley, the parties did not dispute that the engineer believed that the
work he ordered was within the scope of the contract. Here, there is evidence
that Mr. Harrison knew that the work was outside the scope of Build' s contract,
thus creating a disputed issue of material fact. That evidence was before Judge
Kennedy on the first motion for summary judgment. Ignoring or discounting
that evidence is inappropriate on summary judgment. On this basis alone, Judge
Harris erred in dismissing Build' s claims.
Second, Judge Harris' s ruling also violates the coordinate judge rule.
UDOT argues that either the coordinate judge rule does not apply to an
interlocutory order, or, if it does, Judge Harris's ruling falls into an exception to
that rule because it corrects an error made by Judge Kennedy's application of

Meadow Valley. Neither argument is preserved and both arguments fail on their
merits. Neither Mid-America nor McLaughlin purports to overrule, or narrow, the
coordinate judge rule articulated in Sittner. In fact, the Utah Supreme Court's
most recent pronouncement on the topic cites Sittner' s articulation of the
coordinate judge rule- i.e., that a judge may not reverse an order of a previous,
equivalent-ranking judge in the same case. USA Power, LLC v. Pacificorp, 2016 UT
20,372 P.3d 629. And UDOT's assertion that Judge Harris was "correcting"
Judge Kennedy's application of Meadow Valley fails because Judge Harris
expressed doubt at the hearing that Judge Kennedy had erred. The coordinate
judge rule is the current law in Utah and applies to Judge Harris' s ruling.

2
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finally, Judge Harris also erred when he dismissed Build' s claim for
consequential damages sua sponte. On appeal, UDOT argues that Judge Harris
correctly dismissed Build' s claims because Build could not prove the amount of
its consequential damages. But the court could not dismiss claims without a
dispositive motion. The court granted UDOT' s motions in limine to exclude the
testimony of two of Build' s witnesses on a type of consequential damages, i.e.,
business devastation. Motions in limine exclude evidence, but are not dipositive
motions. Build did not-but would have in response to a dispositive motionprovide the trial court with other evidence of consequential damages, such as
other evidence of business valuation or of attorney fees. UDOT also argues that
Build's claims for attorney fees are not preserved, despite UDOT's mention of
·attorney fees in its summary judgment papers and the fact that Build did not
have the opportunity to provide evidence of additional consequential damages.
The trial court failed to consider the evidence provided in opposition to a
motion for summary judgment in reconsidering the denial of that same motion.
The court also lacked authority to reconsider the denial of the motion for
summary judgment under the coordinate judge rule. Finally, the trial court erred
in dismissing Build' s claim for consequential damages after granting a motion in
limine directed at some of Build' s evidence of consequential damages. This court
should reverse.

3
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Argument

Judge Harris's order granting summary judgment for UDOT and
dismissing Build' s consequential damages claim was flawed for three reasons,
any of which requires reversal and remand. first, Judge Harris ignored or
weighed conflicting evidence- both inappropriate on summary judgment-to
rule that Build had not provided any evidence of a key disputed fact. Second,
Judge Harris violated the coordinate judge rule, which, contrary to UDOT's
assertions, remains good law and was recently cited by the Utah Supreme Court.
Judge Harris did not identify any error of Judge Kennedy that would have
warranted an exception to the coordinate judge rule. Third, even if Judge Harris
had the discretion to dismiss Build's consequential damages claims sua sponte, he
cannot do so on the grounds that Build lacks evidence of consequential damages
before Build has been given the opportunity to present the jury with evidence of
consequential damages, such as attorney fees.
1.

Judge Harris Erred By Ignoring Or Weighing Evidence On a Material
Disputed Fact Where Judge Kennedy Had Already Ruled That Summary
Judgment Was Not Appropriate

UDOT asserts that Judge Harris properly dismissed Build' s claims because
there was no disputed material fact and the change in work was not extra work
as a matter of law. Judge Harris found, and UDOT agrees, that Build presented
no evidence that Mr. Harrison "made a 'knowing and deliberate' change" when
he ordered Build to haul excess waste offsite. (UDOT Resp. Br. at 50-51;
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R.15785;.) UDOT also asserts that, as a matter of law, Mr. Harrison's belief that no
change to the contract occurred is legally correct. (UDOT Resp. Br. at 54.) Both
assertions are incorrect.
There are two mutually-exclusive sections of the contract at issue here, as
in Meadow Valley. Which one applies turns on whether the engineer, at the time
he ordered the work to be performed, believed the work to be outside the scope
v.ib

of the contract. Meadow Valley, 2011 UT 35, ,r 32 (Mr. Squire's (the engineer) belief
that a change altered the contract was key fact). The "Differing Site Conditions,
Changes, and Extra Work provision" (Section 1.5 here) is triggered when the
engineer believes the work to be within the scope of the contract at the time of the

change and the contractor disagrees, giving rise to the "alleged change" dispute
and the requirement that the contractor provide written notice to UDOT. On the
other hand, the "Significant Changes in the Character of Work" provision
(Section 1.6 here) is triggered when the engineer believes the work is outside the
scope of the contract at the time of the change, or, in the language of Meadow Valley,
the change is "knowing and deliberate" on the part of the UDOT engineer. Id.
Under that provision, it is the engineer who must provide the written notice of
the change, not the contractor.
UDOT argues that the change at issue here is an "alleged change" and
therefore Section 1.5 applies as matter of law. This argument is based on two
erroneous assertions: (i) Build provided no evidence that Rex Harrison believed

5
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

that the work ordered was outside the scope of the contract; and (ii) the change
is, as a matter of law, within the scope of the contract. Build addresses each
assertion in turn.

1.1

Build provided evidence of a disputed fact which was considered
by Judge Kennedy when he denied summary judgment and is
sufficient to defeat summary judgment under Utah law

All parties agree that what Rex Harrison believed the contract required at
the time that he ordered Build to haul the waste off-site is a material fact. (UDOT
Resp. Br. at 51-52.) UDOT is challenging whether the dispute about this fact is
genuin~ and characterizes Build's argument regarding Mr. Harrison's belief as
11

"brash conjecture" or speculation and surmise."(UDOT Resp. Br. at 53-54.) In
support of this characterization, UDOT cites not evidence, but two federal
opinions from the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit that were
decided under federal rule 56.
UDOT does not cite any Utah authority for what constitutes a genuine
dispute of material fact. The Utah Supreme Court has held that the applicable
standard under federal rule 56 is different from Utah's rule 56 on this exact point.
Federal law, stemnting from the Celotex trilogy, shifts the burden of establishing
a genuine dispute of material fact to the norunovant if the moving party
11

demonstrates that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving
party's case." J. Geils Band Employee Ben. Plan v. Smith Barney Shearson, Inc., 76
F.3d 1245, 1251 (1st Cir. 1996) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,325
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(1986)). This is not Utah law. The Utah Supreme Court expressly rejected the

Celotex reasorung and "does not allow a summary judgment movant to merely
point out a lack of evidence in the nonmoving party's case, but instead requires a
movant to affirmatively provide factual evidence establishing that there is no
genuine issue of material fact." Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2,

,r 16, 177 P.3d 600.

UDOT asserts, as it did below, that Mr. Harrison's belief that the "off-site
disposal of material was not a change" to the contract is an "undisputed fact."
(UDOT Resp. Br. at 53; R.11632,14672.) And as it did below, UDOT provides no
evidence in support of its assertion that the fact is not disputed, but only cites
Rex Harrison's testimony as definitive. (UDOT Resp. Br. at 53; R.14664.) In fact,
Build provided the following evidence showing the dispute:·
• Language in the contract indicating that "[£]ill slopes may be
flattened as shown on plans in order to waste excess
material." (R. 1285, 3114, 3117 (Op. Br. at Add. C).)
• Language in the contract indicating how much excavated
material would be disposed of at various locations within the
project site. (R. 1331 (Op. Br. at Add. D).)

• Mr. Harrison's testimony that "the contractor was allowed to
dispose of excavated material in waste areas" within the
project site. (R. 13714, 3504 (Op. Br. at Add. E).)
• A change order, completed by UDOT during the project,
indicating that part of the project "is constructed on an
unstable historic land slide" and detailing the "corrective
action" taken to "improve its stability per Geotechnical
Engineers['] recommendations." (R. 7743 (Op. Br. at Add. F).)

• Mr. Harrison's testimony that he instructed Build to haul the
excess clay offsite based upon an exercise of his "personal
engineering judgment, along with our geotechnical

7
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recommendations" after becoming "aware of subsurface
movement in that particular slide area." (R. 3456, 3511-12 (Op.
Br. at Add. E).)
• A letter from Mr. Harrison, acknowledging that a
"change
[w]as the basis of [Build's] claim in that
[excavated material] could no longer be effectively disposed
of within the contract limits." (R. 3456-57, 3530 (Op. Br. at
Add. G.)

•" ...

In addition to Build's evidence disputing this key fact, Judge Kennedy
ruled that UDOT's claims were "subject to questions of fact" on several issuesall of which turn on this key fact. (R.9837.) Judge Harris either had to ignore or
improperly discount Build' s evidence to reach the opposite result.
1.2

Whether the work ordered by Rex Harrison was within the scope
of the contract is a question of fact, not a matter of law

UDOT' s second, somewhat confusing, assertion is that "Harrison's belief
that no change occurred is legally, as well as factually established." (UDOT Resp.
Br. at 54.) 2 UDOT then cites to "Specification 02231, Part 3.4" of the contract and
Even more confusing is UDOT' s authority for this argument. Citing 30-yearold federal Court of Claims opinions, UDOT presents the elements of a "changed
condition" claim, which it then says Build fails to meet. (UDOT Resp. Br. at 5456.) The two opinions relied upon by UDOT are federal opinions dealing with a
specific factual circumstance where a contractor relies on incorrect plans or
specifications and so seeks an equitable adjustment. Weeks Dredging &
Contracting, Inc. v. U.S., 13 Cl. Ct. 193,218 (1987) (establishing the "six
indispensable elements" for an equitable adjustment based on material difference
between subsurface conditions described in the contract and actual conditions);
Pacific Alaska Contractors, Inc. v. U.S., 436 F.2d 461, 864-65 (Cl. Ct. 1971) (to obtain
equitable adjustment, the contractor must show "indications which induced
reasonable reliance" on the subsurface conditions in the contract). But Build is
not attempting to obtain payment for extra work because UDOT' s plans were
misleading or incorrect, but because UDOT' s engineer made a knowing and
deliberate change, per the contract. Aside from not being Utah law, the elements
of a changed condition claim in the Court of Claims opinions relied upon by
UDOT are not instructive or relevant to the contract interpretation question at
issue here.
2
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characterizes these provisions as "merely suggest[ing] the possibility that Build
may be able to waste material on site but would not necessarily be able to do so."

(Id. at 55.) Therefore, in UDOT's opinion, hauling the waste material off-site was
within the scope of the contract as a matter of law.
This argument is raised for the first time by UDOT in the response brief
filed with this court. It was not raised before Judge Harris and Judge Harris
made no ruling regarding whether the hauling of waste material off-site was
within the scope of the contract as a matter of law. (See R.11622-637,14657-683,
15784-85.) Rather, Judge Harris granted summary judgment because he found
that there was no dispute of fact regarding Mr. Harrison's belief. (R.15785.)
Indeed, all of the analysis of the district court focused on Mr. Harrison's belief
about the work. If UDOT' s new position about the meaning of the contract were
correct-and had been raised-it would have rendered superfluous the district
court's analysis of Mr. Harrison's mental state. UDOT itself points this out when
it says: "[t]he material and dispositive fact is that Mr. Harrison believed that offsite disposal of material was not a change to or alteration of the contract.
Whether Mr. Harrison was mistaken in his belief is not material." (UDOT Resp.
Br. at 51-52.)
The scope of the work contemplated by the contract is a matter of contract
interpretation, a question which has not been addressed by the district court.
(R.15784-85.) "A contract's interpretation may be either a question of law,
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determined by the words of the agreement, or a question of fact, determined by
extrinsic evidence of intent." Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985). In
other words, only if the contract language is unambiguous can the question be
decided as a matter of law. But UDOT does not argue that the language of the
contract unambiguously states that waste material will be disposed of off-site.
Nor does UDOT address the conflict between the section it is citing and other
sections which state that the fill slopes on-site would take the waste material.
(R.854, 3114, 3117, 1331 (Op. Br. at Add. C-D).) UDOT instead relies on an edited
quote from the contract to make an ad hoc argument that attempts to circumvent
the question of Rex Harrison's belief. (UDOT Resp. Br. at 55.)
On the merits, the section cited by UDOT in support of the argument that
hauling waste off-site is within the scope of the contract describes disposal both
on- and off-site but does not dictate which of those is required by the contract.
(R.5041.) The relevant language from the section cited by UDOT, Section 02231,
states:
3.4

DISPOSAL
A.

Dispose of material in accordance with Section 01355.

B.

Do not dispose of material within the designated
roadbed.

C.

Outside of the right-of-way:
1.

Acceptable when done according to prevailing laws
(including environmental laws), ordinances,
regulations, and rules, and at no additional cost
to the Department.
10
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2.
D.

Furnish the Engineer with copies of the disposal
permits or agreements.

Inside the right-of-way:
1.

Bury material at locations specified by or
acceptable to the Engineer.

2.

Use material to widen embankments and flatten
embankment side slopes as approved by the
Engineer....

(Id., attached at Add.Hat 3 (emphasis added).)
First, UDOT misreads Section 02231 in stating that the section
"contemplates that off-site disposal" will be done at no cost to UDOT. (UDOT
Resp. Br. at 55) Instead, the contract states that off-site disposal is acceptable only

when it can be done in accordance with laws and at no additional cost to UDOT.
(R.5041.) This cuts against UDOT' s argument that requesting Build to haul the
material off-site was within the scope of the contract because that could not be
done at no cost to the UDOT and therefore was not "acceptable" under this
provision of the contract.
Second, Section 02231 merely provides conditions that trigger on- or off1.@

site disposal and the procedures to be followed- it does not inform the reader as
to what or how much on- or off-site disposal is within the scope of the contract
and therefore included within the bid price. That is done in Section 00725, titled
"Scope of Work" and in the Arcadia Project Plans, which Build attached to its
opening brief. (See Op. Br. at Add. B- D.) These sections of the contract prescribe
that the waste material can be used to fill the slopes on the plans - a condition
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that changed after a landslide was discovered in the area, leading Mr. Harrison
to take the precaution of having the material hauled off-site. (R.854,3114, 3117,
3503,3511-12.)
Under UDOT' s contract interpretation, if both Section 02231 and the
provisions describing placing the waste material on-site dictate the scope of work
under the contract, then they are in conflict. This cannot be the intent of the
parties. At the very least, the language cited to by UDOT is ambiguous as to the
scope of work required by the contract and therefore makes the contract's
interpretation a question of fact, not of law. Hence, under the contract's terms,
the belief of Mr. Harrison is material and his subjective state of mind is factually
in dispute.
2.

The Coordinate Judge Rule Does Apply To Judge Harris's Ruling and
Judge Harris Did Not Correct an Error in Judge Kennedy's Ruling
UDOT advances three reasons why the coordinate judge rule does not

prevent Judge Harris from overruling Judge Kennedy. First, UDOT argues that
the coordinate judge rule does not apply to interlocutory orders. (UDOT Resp.
Br. at43-46.) Second, UDOT argues that law of the case, generally, does not
apply to district court decisions prior to appeal and therefore any district court
judge may overrule a previous judge sua sponte. (Clyde-Geneva Resp. Br. at
32,35-41.) Third, UDOT argues that, even if the coordinate judge rule does apply,
Judge Harris's ruling fell within an exception to that rule because he was
correcting an error in Judge Kennedy's ruling. (UDOT Resp. Br. at 46-48.)
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None of UDOT's arguments are preserved. But even if this court treats
them as adequate alternative grounds on the record, UDOT is incorrect in
substance as well. The coordinate judge rule remains consistent with Utah case
law and Judge Harris identified no error that would qualify his ruling for an
exception to the coordinate judge rule.
2.1

UDOT's arguments regarding the coordinate judge rule are not
preserved

Before Judge Harris, UDOT argued only that the coordinate judge rule did
not apply because, as UDOT put it to Judge Harris, "UDOT is not asking the
Court to overrule Judge Kennedy but is instead asking the Court to clarify issues
that Uudge Kennedy's] Order did not address." (R.14668.) UDOT now argues the
opposite: that Judge Harris did properly reconsider Judge Kennedy's ruling and
that the coordinate judge rule does not apply to either interlocutory orders or
decisions before appeal-neither of which was argued below. (UDOT Resp. Br. at
43-48; Clyde-Geneva Resp. Br. at 35-41.) UDOT is not just relying on additional
case law; it is advancing a new substantive legal theory, rather than a procedural
one, as to why the coordinate judge rule does not apply.
UDOT argued below that, in the alternative, even if the coordinate judge
rule did apply, it fell into the error exception because Judge Kennedy erred by
failing "to rule on the [unaddressed] legal issues and to specify the material facts
which are disputed." (R.14669.) UDOT now takes a different tack and argues, in
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vague terms, that Judge Kennedy erred in his application of Meadow Valley.
(UDOT Resp. Br. at 47.).
2.2

Mid-America and McLaughlin did not overrule Sittner' s
articulation of the coordinate judge rule

The coordinate judge rule is long-standing and has never been overruled
by the Utah Supreme Court. See USA Power, LLC v. Pacificorp, 2016 UT 20,

,r 38,

372 P.3d 629 (adopting the coordinate judge rule from AMS Salt Indus., Inc. v.

Magnesium Corp. of Am., 942 P.2d 315,319 (Utah 1997)). Yet UDOT maintains that
the coordinate judge rule no longer applies to interlocutory orders and that a
district court judge can overrule another district court judge at his or her
discretion-making the coordinate judge indistinguishable from general law of
the case doctrine. (UDOT Resp. Br. at 43-48; Clyde-Geneva Resp. Br. at 35-41.)
This is at odds with the supreme court's latest pronouncement on the issue in

USA Power and thirty years of Utah precedent.
Admittedly, there has been some inconsistency in the supreme court's
application of the coordinate judge rule, but it is clear that the rule, as first
articulated in Sittner v. Big Horn Tar Sands & Oil, Inc., 692 P.2d 735 (Utah 1985)
and affirmed in several subsequent opinions, including the 2016 USA Power
decision, is still good law. To understand the current status of the coordinate
judge rule, it is necessary to examine the development of two lines of Utah case
law pertinent to the issue.
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The Sittner line - In Sittner, the court was presented with a procedural
question nearly identical to the situation here. Sittner moved for summary
judgment, looking to hold nine defendants liable under a prior judgment. Id. at
736. The motion was denied as to all defendants by a first judge. Id. The case was
reassigned to a second judge and Sittner again moved for summary judgment
with respect to five of the previous defendants. Id. The second judge granted the
vJ

motion and the five defendants appealed, arguing that the "[second] judge erred
because he overruled a decision by a coequal." Id.
The Sittner court agreed, elaborating on the preexisting rule that "one
judge of the same court cannot properly overrule the decision of another judge in
the same case." Id. (quoting Richardson v. Grand Central Corp., 572 P.2d 395,397
(Utah 1977)). The Sittner court then referred to several exceptions to the rule, but
found none to be satisfied after analyzing the only possibly pertinent exception,
one which applies when a second motion is presented in "a different light." Id.
The court also described the broader policy behind the coordinate judge rule: "to
avoid the delays and difficulties that arise when one judge is presented with an
issue identical to the one which has already been passed upon by a coordinate
judge in the same case." Id.
In Mascaro v. Davis, the court reinforced the Sittner holding and reversed a
grant of a motion to set aside default judgment by a second judge when the same
had already been denied by a previous judge. 741 P.2d 938, 946-47 (Utah 1987).
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Citing Sittner and seven other Utah Supreme Court opinions, the Mascaro court
stated that the court has "repeatedly indicated that one district court judge
cannot overrule another district court judge of equal authority" and reiterated
the Sittner policy for the rule. Id. at 946-47. The court also held that the rule is
consistent with Utah Code section 78-7-19 (now codified as section 78A-2-226(1))
which forbids parties from mal<lng a "subsequent application for the same
order" when that order has already been "refused in whole or in part or is
granted conditionally." Id. (citing Utah Code§ 78-7-19).
Several opinions followed in the same vein. State v. Lamper restated the
II

Sittner rule, applying the exception that a second judge may then reexamine an
earlier ruling" if there has been "a change in the governing law." 779 P.2d 1125,
1129 (Utah 1989) (emphasis added). The court in AMS Salt Industries, citing

Mascaro, held that a second judge's grant of summary judgment, overruling a
11

partial summary judgment ruling of a prior judge, was within the ~ifferent
light" exception to the coordinate judge rule as stated by Sittner. 942 P.2d at 319.
And, in Red Flame, Inc. v. Martinez, the court again restated the Sittner rule,
explan:ung that while "[i]t is not that the second judge lacks power to revisit an
earlier judge's ruling ... [rather] there are circumstances where that power
should not be exercised." 2000 UT 22, 1 4, 996 P.2d 540. As examples of when a
second judge can revisit an earlier ruling, the court listed the two existing
exceptions to the coordinate judge rule- presenting the issues in "a different
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light" and a change in governing law-and articulated a third exception for
when the first judge's ruling is "clearly erroneous." Id.

,r,r 4-5. Many of these

opinions were situations where, like Sittner, the second trial court judge had
overruled the first trial court judge on an interlocutory order, yet the coordinate
judge rule applied. The rule, and its exceptions, therefore applies equally to
interlocutory and final orders.
,..::;

The Mid-America line - UDOT suggests that Mid-America and McLaughlin,
decided by the supreme court in 2009 and 2013, abrogated the Sittner coordinate
judge rule sub silentio, or otherwise made the rule co-extensive with general law
of the case doctrine. While it appears that the Mid-America court either did not
apply the coordinate judge rule or inadvertently viewed the coordinate judge
rule as coextensive with the law of the case doctrine, both Mid-America and

McLaughlin rely almost entirely on IHC Health Services, Inc. v. D & K Management,
2008 UT 73,196 P.3d 588, for their discussion of the law of the case doctrine. Mid-

America, 2009 UT 43, ,r,r 11-15; McLaughlin, 2013 UT 20, ,r,r 21-24. The problem
with this reliance is thatIHC did not apply or discuss the coordinate judge rule
because there was only one trial court judge for the orders at issue. IHC, 2008 UT
73,

,r,r 10-13. The court in IHC was applying general law of the case doctrine, not

the coordinate judge rule. Id.

,r,r 24-37. The IHC court then interpreted the trial

court's discretion under law of the case doctrine in light of rule 54(b). Id.
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,r 27.

Mid-America adopts the rule 54(b) language from IHC wholesale and
applies the general law of the case doctrine to a factual circumstance that
involved coordinate judges. And it did so without any discussion of Sittner or the
opinions following Sittner. Mid-America, 2009 UT 43,

,r,r 11-15. The Mid-America

court ruled that the appellants were attempting to "invert[] the law by
suggesting that law of the case doctrine prevents a district court from
reconsidering a resolved issue." Id.

,r 11. In so holding, Mid-America blurred the

distinction between the law the case doctrine, generally, and the more specific
coordinate judge rule. McLaughlin followed the Mid-America/ IHC reasoning
under similar circumstances. McLaughlin, 2013 UT 20, ,r,r 21-24.
USA Power reaffirms the Sittner line - If Mid-America or McLaughlin was

the last supreme court opinion to address the coordinate judge rule, UDOT's
argument might have merit. But they are not. USA Power is the supreme court's
most recent pronouncement on the coordinate judge rule and it firmly
reestablished the existence of the rule as articulated in Sittner.
UDOT is correct that the factual circumstance in USA Power is not
analogous to the situation here. However, Build is not relying on USA Power for
the proposition that the coordinate judge rule applies to this case, but only for
the proposition that the Sittner line of opinions is still good law. USA Power states
that "when a trial court judge reviews another trial court judge's ruling, the
doctrine prevents the second judge from overruling the first." 2016 UT 20, ,r 38
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(citing AMS, 942 P.2d 315, 319.) The "doctrine" the court is referring to is "a
standard used in another branch of law of the case doctrine," otherwise known
as the coordinate judge rule. Id. USA Power actually expands the application of
the coordinate judge rule and its exceptions. The court reasoned that the rule not
only applies to two trial court judges, but found this rule .uto also be appropriate
in the context of a trial court's review of factual issues decided by an appellate

court." Id. USA Power cites only opinions in the Sittner line in its analysis. Id.

,r 38

n.23-24 & 26-27 (citing AMS, 942 P.2d 315, 319, for the coordinate judge rule and
"different light" exception and Red Flame, 2000 UT 22,

,r ,r 4-5, for when the

"different light" exception is satisfied).
The more specific coordinate judge rule under Sittner does exactly what

Mid-America reasoned the general law of the case doctrine does not do- it
"inverts" law of the case to limit a coordinate judge's discretion to overrule a
previous judge to certain factual circumstances. 692 P.2d at 736. Otherwise the
purpose of the coordinate judge rule- to "avoid the delays and difficulties" of
',ct\

v,iJP

rehashing an issue identical to one already ruled on by another judge- is
completely frustrated and the coordinate judge rule is indistinguishable from
law of the case doctrine generally, rather than functioning as a more specific
"branch" of law of the case. Id.; USA Power, 2016 UT 20, ,r 38.

If this court relies on the opinions that specifically address the coordinate
judge rule- the line of opinions originating from Sittner and reaffirmed in USA
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Power- there is no need to reconcile this case with the Mid-America line that
applies the more general law of the case doctrine. And on its facts, the coordinate
judge rule clearly applies to Judge Harris' s overruling of Judge Kennedy's
decision on the exact same issues.
2.3

Judge Harris's ruling does not fall into the "error" exception to the
coordinate judge rule

In the alternative, UDOT argues that, even if the coordinate judge rule
does apply, Judge Harris was correcting an error in Judge Kennedy's ruling-an
exception to the coordinate judge rule. (UDOT Resp. Br. at 43.) This exception to
the coordinate judge rule comes from the supreme court's decision in Red Flame,

Inc. v. Martinez, 2000 UT 22, 996 P.2d 540. There, the court held that" although the
factual and legal posture of the case has not changed" a second judge may
overrule a first judge if "it appears to the second judge that the first ruling was
clearly erroneous and will infect subsequent proceedings with error." Id.

,r 5. The

court has not defined on this exception further but, under the general law of the
case doctrine, a similar exception has been defined as one in which the prior
decision "was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice." Gildea v.

Guardian Title Co., 2001 UT 75, ,I 9, 31 P.3d 543.
The supreme court has interpreted manifest injustice to be synonymous
with plain error. Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, ,r 61, 130 P.3d 325; Crookston v. Fire

Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991). "The plain error test has three parts: the
demonstration of error; a qualitative showing that the error was plain, manifest,

20
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

or obvious to the trial court; and evidence that the error affected the substantial
rights of a party." Jensen, 2005 UT 81, ,r 61; State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55, ,r,r 42-50,
82 P.3d 1106.
Neither UDOT nor Judge Harris identify or demonstrate the existence of
plain error in Judge Kennedy's decision. UDOT now argues that the error was
Judge Kennedy's misapplication of Meadow Valley. (UDOT Resp. Br. at47.) Any
such error is far from "plain". Because UDOT did not even argue to Judge Harris
that Judge Kennedy misapplied Meadow Valley before Judge Harris, and Judge
Harris made no specific finding about how Judge Kennedy misapplied Meadow

Valley, it is difficult to see how the error could be obvious. UDOT relies on
equivocal statements from Judge Harris during the hearing where he admits not
understanding how Judge Kennedy "distinguished" Meadow Valley. (Id.) This is
not an identification of obvious error, it is the opposite. Judge Harris
acknowledged this himself when he stated that "Judge Kennedy heard all of this,
he was the judge, the trial judge in Meadow Valley and he probably should have
caught this if it was an error to be caught." (R.16387 (emphasis added)). This is not
an identification of a plain error, it is an expression of doubt that any error has
been made.
This is why the coordinate judge rule should apply. Judge Kennedy

believed that Build' s evidence was sufficient to support its claims at trial and was
well aware of the controlling legal standard, Meadow Valley, when he made that
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decision. Allowing a second judge to overrule that decision, without any
indication that Judge Kennedy erred or was somehow otherwise unable to make
a correct decision on summary judgment, delays and frustrates judicial economy
and consistency. And as noted above, there is no reason to think that Judge
Kennedy misapplied Meadow Valley.

3.

Judge Harris Erred in Dismissing Build's Consequential Damages Claim
Without a Dispositive Motion

There are two errors arising from Judge Harris' s dismissal of Build' s
consequential damages claim. First, Judge Harris did so without authority.
Second, Judge Harris did not allow Build to provide, let alone consider, other
evidence for the business valuation or other types of consequential damages.
UDOT asserts that Judge Harris had the authority to dismiss Build' s claim
under the district court's "own inherent power" to dismiss claims in granting a
motion in limine. (UDOT Resp. Br. at 57-59.) But Utah law says the opposite.

Fisher v. Davidhizar, 2011 UT App 270, ,r 14 & n. 11, 263 P.3d 440.
Assuming the district court had authority to treat the motion in limine as a .
dispositive motion, UDOT asserts that Build cannot prove consequential
damages. But UDOT ignores the fact that Build can, at the very least, prove the
amount of its attorney fees, and, at most, can provide different evidence of the
value of its business. (UDOT Resp. Br. at 60-61.)
Finally, UDOT asserts that Build did not preserve its claims for attorney
fees as consequential damages. (UDOT Resp. Br. at 62-63; Clyde-Geneva Resp.
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Br. at 48-55.) But UDOT fails to mention not only that a party need not provide
other evidence to support a claim in opposing a motion in limine, but also that
UDOT acknowledged in its original summary judgment papers that Build' s
downfall could be attributed to its incurring attorney fees-a type of
consequential damages.
3.1

A trial court cannot sua sponte dismiss claims without a
dispositive motion because it prejudices the party whose claims
are dismissed

UDOT argues that a district court may "dismiss a meritless claim sua

sponte under Rule (12)(b)(6), Rule 41, or simply under its own inherent power."
(UDOT Resp. Br. at 57. Rule 12 is not at issue here and Rule 41 does not allow a
district court to dismiss for lack of evidence, but only for failure of the plaintiff
J'/to prosecute or to comply with the[] rules." Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b). That leaves
UDOT' s broad statement that the district court can dismiss claims, without any
dispositive motion pending, under "its own inherent power," which has no
support in Utah law support.
UDOT cites a number of opinions from federal courts and other
jurisdictions to support this claim but admits that "Utah appellate cases have not
directly addressed district court's inherent power to dismiss an unmeritorious
claim." (UDOT Resp. Br. at 57.) The federal opinions upon which UDOT relies
are either considering district court dismissals under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) or under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which allows a district court to
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dismiss an indigent plaintiff's frivolous claim sua sponte. Fitzgerald v. First E.

Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363-64 (2nd Cir. 2000) (holding that
district courts can dismiss frivolous claims that would have been dismissed
under section 1915(e)(2)).Those opinions have no application here.
Nor are the federal opinions analogous to a circumstance where there has
been extensive discovery and litigation and a district court attempts to dismiss
claims summarily after excluding evidence but without a pending dispositive
motion. In fact, Utah law disapproves of just such a practice. In Fisher v.

Davidhizar, this court reversed a trial court's decision to treat a non-dispositive
motion in limine as dispositive, particularly after the dispositive motion deadline
had passed. 2011 UT App 270, ,r 14 & n. 11, 263 P.3d 440. Similarly, in Osburn v.

Bott, this court reversed a trial court's decision to summarily dismiss a petition
for a civil stalking injunction without notice or an opportunity to respond
because "the appearance of unfairness" was "plain." 2011 UT App 138, ,r 8,257
P.3d 1028 (internal citations omitted). That is precisely what occurred here.
3.2

Dismissing claims sua sponte prejudices Build because Build was
not able to present evidence or preserve its argument for appeal

In dismissing Build's claims sua sponte after excluding the testimony of two
witnesses for different reasons, the trial court deprived Build of the opportunity
to respond to the potential dismissal of its claims, namely, to present the court
with other evidence of consequential damages. UDOT asserts that the court
properly deprived Build of the opportunity to provide other evidence because
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Build had not provided other evidence in opposing the motion in limine. (UDOT
Resp. Br. at 59.) Depriving a party of the opportunity to present evidence cannot
be appropriate because the party did not present that evidence.
Nor is this "bad policy," as UDOT claims, unless due process concerns are
bad policy. The alternative is to allow parties to file motions in limine to exclude
evidence- after the dispositive motion deadline- and encourage the trial court
to dismiss sua sponte without allowing the opposing party to respond or preserve
arguments. UDOT cannot wait until long after the dispositive motion deadline to
file its motions in limine, only to have them treated as dispositive motions.
In Build' s response to the motions in limine, it did not describe other
evidence of consequential damages - such as what other witness may be able to
provide or attorney fees - because marshaling additional evidence had nothing
to do with the exclusion of the witness testimony. As one example, Build could
have used statements regarding litigation expenses made by Build's CEO, Kevin
Nilsen. (R.7243-74,7249,7251-53.) Build has evidence of consequential damages:
the over half a million dollars in attorney fees that Build has had to pay as a
result of litigation over UDOT's breach of contract. (R.7243-74,7249,7251-53.)
And depriving Build of the opportunity to present the trial court with
additional evidence of consequential damages was prejudicial. Judge Harris
erred in summarily dismissing Build' s· claims for consequential damages sua
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sponte after excluding only two types of evidence for one type of consequential
damages.
3.3

Build's claim for attorney fees is preserved below

UDOT argues that Build' s attorney fees claim is not preserved. (UDOT
Resp. Br. at 62-63; Clyde-Geneva Resp. Br. at 48-55.) But UDOT' sown filings
acknowledge that Build's litigation expenses were "the culprit" in Build's
demise. (R.7172-73.) Furthermore, had Build been given the opportunity to
respond to a properly brought and framed dispositive motion for summary
judgment on its consequential damages claims, it would have included the
evidence of attorney fees under the third-party tort rule in its response, thus
preserving its argument for appeal. Build' s evidence for attorney fees and the
lack of opportunity to preserve its argument on appeal are discussed further in
the follow sections.
Conclusion

This court should reverse Judge Harris' s dismissal of Build' s breach of
contract and consequential damages claims.
DATED this 23rd day of December, 2016.
ZIMMERMAN JONES BOOHER
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Attorneys for Appellant Build Inc.
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SECTION 02231

SITE CLEARING AND GRUBBING
PARTl
1.1

SECTION INCLUDES
A

1.2

1.3

GENERAL

Clear, grub, remove and dispose of trees, stumps, and debris within the designated
limits of the roadways, channels, easements, and other designated areas.

RELATED SECTIONS
A.

Section 01355: Environmental Protection

B.

Section 01571; Temporary Environmental Controls

C.

Section 02221: Remove Structure and Obstruction

DEFINITIONS
A.

Clear: remove and dispose of trees, stumps, logs, limbs, sticks, vegetation, debris,
and other material on the natural ground suiface.

B.

Grub: remove and dispose of roots, buried logs, debris, and other material under
the ground surface.

t.4

PAYl\'ffiNT PROCEDURES
A.

PART2

\vnen there is no bid item included in the proposal for £'Site Clearing and
Grubbing:"
1.
This work is considered incidental to other items of work and no separate
measurement or payment will be made.
2.
Include all costs in other items of work.

PRODUCTS

Not used
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PART3

3.1

---------------------

EXECUTION

PREPARATION
A.

Verify with Engiqcer the vegetation or objects to be removed

B.

Review work procedures with Engineer.

C.

Schedule work carefully v..ith consideration for property owners and general
public.

D.

3.2

Refer to Section 01571 for temporary environmental measures.

VEGETA'fION REMOVAL
A

Grub the areas 2 feet below natural ground ·within the limits of clearing of all
stumps, roots, buried logs, and all other underground obstructions.

B.

Stumps, roots 7 and non-perishable solid objects may remain in cleared areas
where the embanlanent is:
l.
2.0 feet or more above the natnral groun~
2.
At least 2.0 feet away·outsidc the slope stake lines.

C.

Completely grub $lumps and roots where a structure is to be constructed,. piles are
to be driven, or unsuitable material is to be removed.

3.3

BACKFILLING
A.

Backfill a.11 stump holes, cuts, depressions, and other holes resulting from clearing
and grubbing within areas to receive embankment Compact backfilled areas to
the density of the surrounding ground.

B.

Measure and pay separately for materials used for backfilling under "Roadway

Excavation" or"Borrow.'' ·

C.

Consider ~'Roadway Excavation" and ~'Borrow" as incidental to the wotk when
these items are not included in the bid proposal. No separate measurement or
payment made in this case.
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3.4

3.5

DISPOSAL
A.

Dispose of material in accormmce with Section 01355.

B.

Do not dispose of material within the designated roadbed.

C.

Outside of the right-of-way:
1.
Acceptable when done according to prevailingla'\1t'S (including
enviro?Jl]ental ~aws):,. ordinances, regulations, and rules, and at no
additional cost to the Department
2.
Furnish the Engineer with copies of the disposal permits or agreements.

D.

Inside the right--of-way;
1.
Bury material at locations specilied by or acceptable to the Engineer.
2.
Use material lo ~iden embankments and flatten embankment side slopes
as approved by the Engineer.
3.
Cover dispo~·ed material with a minimum of 20 ft of earth and grade to
drain properly at no additional cost to the Department
4.
Reduce wood to chips a ma.·1dmum of ½ inch thick for mulching cut and
fill slopes. Chips may be buried or distributed un:iformly on the ground
surface and mixed \\ith the underlying earth so the mi'itures will not
sustain burning.

TREE REMOVAL
A.

;
'~

- ·-·

Refer to Seotion 02221.

-i

3.6

PROTECTION

A.

Land monuments, property markers, or official datum points:
I.
Protect until their r~ oval is approved.
2.
Reference for re-establishment before removing.

B.

Protect trec-$.from damage to roots and branches if tbey are designated to remain.

C.

Protect otl1ervegetation and/or objects designated to remain.

END OF SECTION
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